Sociodicy: Revisiting A Key Sociological Concept

[First published on Critical Legal Thinking.]

Introduction

A sociodicy is a structured attempt to justify the social order in spite of its manifold injustices. Its conceptual lineage can be traced back to the notion of theodicy, or the justification of God despite the existence of evil and suffering, a term that was appropriated and “sociologized” by Max Weber; it was the French mid-20th century sociologist Raymond Aron who expressly coined the term sociodicy, even though it was his student and collaborator Pierre Bourdieu who became its most famous and frequent exponent. On Bourdieu’s usage, sociodicies are narratives that try to shield dominant social strata from criticism over inequalities, hierarchy, domination, and social suffering (that is, pain and distress originating from the social order rather than individual pathology). To take just one example: The idea of social mobility has functioned as a powerful sociodicy in U.S. society, as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999: 51) point out, justifying the existence of significant inequalities on the grounds that any one individual has the (theoretical) possibility of climbing up the social ladder—even if this possibility is, in reality, largely illusory.

To take another example: The notion of meritocracy—that society ought to be, or is in fact, governed by “the best and the brightest”—can operate as a kind of sociodicy, because the procedures by which one arrives at what constitutes “merits,” such as “intelligence” or “brilliance,” are hardly socially neutral: Determining and deciding “who is best” is interwoven with power and domination. In this sense, the political economist Joseph Schumpeter’s claim that class differences are ultimately expressions of “individual differences in aptitude” (1951: 210) glosses over the crucial question of how “aptitude” is formed and judged in the first place. Defining and assigning merit tends, as Bourdieu repeatedly argued, to reward the offspring of the upper and upper-middle classes, via the biased workings of the school system. When poor, unemployed, or marginalized populations are told they live in a meritocratic society, this suggests that their social inferiority must spring from their personal failings, rather than being the result, say, of a system of inherited privileges, the machinations of social elites, or the vagaries of global markets.

In fact, the emphasis on aptitude and its (allegedly) neutral role in distributing power is one of the main ways in which late-modern social orders justify themselves; in an essay from the 1990s, Bourdieu skewers the neoliberal narrative of the “deserving poor,” which maintains, in Bourdieu’s polemical paraphrase, that “the poor are not just immoral, alcoholic and degenerate, they are stupid, they lack intelligence” (1998: 43). In Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu recounts of an elite group that he calls the “state nobility” (i.e. the credentialed rulers of late-modern knowledge societies), that it “finds the principle of its sociodicy in the educational system and in the qualifications which are presumed to guarantee its competence” (Bourdieu 2000: 79). In other words: a segment of the ruling elite thinks it is in a position of power because of its superior intellectual powers, verified by credentials and diplomas from the education system. Bourdieu goes on to excoriate the ideas of giftedness and innate intelligence as markers of legitimate rulership, describing these variously as the “myth of the ‘natural gift’” or even “the racism of intelligence.” Why does the idea of “intelligence” function as a kind of “racism”? Because it essentializes what is to a large degree socially achieved and ascribes the result to a person’s inherent properties.

Formulaically restated, then, we might say that sociodicies are the ideas of the dominant, attempting to become dominant ideas, aimed at turning the fact of domination into a dominant truth.

Social critics tend to think of sociodicies as efforts to justify the unjustifiable, which, as such, are destined to fail, conceptually and theoretically, even though they might, of course, become socially efficacious, in the measure that they attain the status of a social orthodoxy. But a sociodicy is not destined to succeed; indeed, much of what is called politics in essence revolves around attempts at imposing one or other competing discourses about the essential nature of the social order. Politics is a ceaseless struggle over sociodicies (even though it is, of course, about much else besides, including material resources and positions). The labor movements of the twentieth century were to a large degree producers of a counter-narrative: Owners and employers were not “captains of industry” or “creators of wealth,” designations that would legitimize their accumulation of riches; instead, they were revalued as “labor-purchasers” and exploiters of the value-producing working class. Successful subaltern political movements mobilize counter-discourses, attempting to deploy what limited forms of symbolic power that remain open to them to confront the sociodicies of dominant elites.

In places, Bourdieu seems to think the chances of such defiance meeting with success are low: “[T]here is, whether one likes it not, very little ‘resistance’ in these matters” (Bourdieu, 2000: 74). This claim is echoed in Marx and Engels’ well-known statement from The German Ideology that the “ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (1970: 64; emphasis in the original). This may be too pessimistic a view in the long-run, even though it is undoubtedly true that notions of desert, privilege, intelligence, and “merit”-based privileges have been remarkably stable across the Western world over the past century.

Background: From Theology to Max Weber

As noted, the concept of sociodicy has its origins in theology. On Leibniz’s (1710/1951) classical account, a theodicy is any attempt to reconcile God’s essential goodness with the manifest suffering of this world. Aquinas described God as the summum bonum, or “highest good,” in his Summa Theologiae, but the theodicean question is how this Theos (God) could still be said to be a bearer of dike (justice), despite natural “evils” like childhood leukemia or the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 and (moral) evils such as the Holocaust (see e.g. van Inwagen 2006). Theodicies are apologies for God, attempting to make sense of the coexistence of human suffering with an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent Creator. Thinkers have produced numerous theodicies over the centuries; one early form, for instance, is sometimes called compensation theology, that is, the idea that the afterlife compensates for earthly suffering, which one philosopher shrewdly calls a “Heaven swamps everything” theodicy (Maitzen 2009: 122).

Importing this theological discourse into the social sciences some two centuries after Leibniz, the sociologist Max Weber distinguished between a “theodicy of good fortune” (Theodizee des Glückes) and a “theodicy of suffering” (Theodizee des Leidens) (see Swedeberg & Agevall 2016; Wacquant 2023). How can the suffering of the dominated be justified? How can the privilege of the dominant be made acceptable? Commentators have noted that while Weber’s apparent concern is to engage with religious thought, he is really far more interested in the sociology of suffering and privilege. Even as he used the term “theodicy,” he was already thinking its sociological derivation: “As the underpinning of capitalism and the social order generally, Weber may actually have had in mind sociodicy—the legitimation of society in the face of its failures—as much as the justification of the cultural authority of divinity” (Kleinman 1997: 317).

Of course, a theodicy can function as sociodicy. The previously noted idea of compensation theodicy—that the rewards of the afterlife assuage the horrors of everyday reality here and now—clearly has all the qualities of sociodicy: The Church’s religious teachings in the Middle Ages justified the inequalities of feudal society by promising to drown out worldly suffering in an everlasting state of heavenly bliss.

Weber understood that privilege often has a need to justify itself, which is to say that the privileged have an interest in producing accounts that take the sting out of their privilege, both to the “less fortunate,” but also to their own conscience. As Weber astutely observes of the social psychology of wealth and power:

The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this, he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune. He wants to be convinced that he ‘deserves’ it, and above all, that he deserves it in comparison with others. He wishes to be allowed the belief that the less fortunate also merely experience his due. Good fortune thus wants to be ‘legitimate’ fortune.” (Weber 1946: 271)

Weber thinks a “theodicy” of privilege, which is really a secular attempt to legitimize the privileged, is necessary from the standpoint of the psychology of power: The “wound” of domination and privilege needs suturing.

It was the French sociologist Raymond Aron who coined the secular version of the concept, sociodicy (or sociodicée in French), as Jon Elster (1983: 56) notes; the venue, writes Elster (1981), was Aron’s 1970 inaugural lecture at the Collège de France (see Aron 2023). From Aron, the concept appears to have filtered by way of intellectual osmosis into Bourdieu’s thinking: Bourdieu was one of Aron’s protégées in the French academic field, starting as his doctoral student, before eventually codirecting the Centre de sociologie européenne (Center for European Sociology) in Paris, supported by large grants from, among other sources, the Ford Foundation (Cohen 2023), though Aron would later denounce Bourdieu as a “cult leader, self-confident and dominating” (Aron 2010).

Be that as it may, it became an important concept within Bourdieu’s wider theoretical universe, perhaps because of its close affinities with another keyword in his sociological lexicon, symbolic power (the mobilization of, inter alia, categories, concepts, and other organizing ideas). Unlike Habermasian appeals to communicative rationality, Bourdieu understood that sociodicy operated at an essentially ingratiating level—not necessarily prediscursive, but certainly not reliant upon the clear lining up of syllogisms and arguments in reasoned fashion: That sociodicy which is least recognized qua justificatory discourse is perhaps most likely to succeed. A sociodicy works best when it worms its way into the collective consciousness: Who today seriously questions the seemingly self-evident validity and reality of “intelligence” as distributive principle of honor and material-symbolic rewards, outside of a few pockets of critical reflexive thought?

Why Sociodicy?

Let’s consider another illustrative example of sociodicy—more specifically, how extreme wealth inequalities might be justified. A Silicon Valley billionaire might fairly be accused of exploiting workers and hoarding wealth, which is, in the final instance, socially or communally produced. In response, however, a late-modern sociodicy might be mobilized, responding that the billionaire’s super-profits are nevertheless justified due to (i) heightened risk (the billionaire could have lost everything at some crucial, earlier stage, and financial and existential risks should be compensated for), (ii) unique innovations (the billionaire was the only one to seize upon an opportunity, new idea, or nascent technology, and exceptional talent should be stimulated and rewarded), and, consequently, (iii) net social benefits (the spill-over effects of what is admittedly an unsavory wealth accumulation are nevertheless large enough that, in net terms, society as a whole stands to gain). The billionaire may be extremely wealthy, but, so the story goes, we should learn to hold our noses, because the technical and social benefits outweigh the costs of permitting extreme concentrations of wealth. If the price of space rockets or operating systems is an oligarchic elite, then so be it.

All of these admittedly somewhat stylized justifications have their set responses, of course, many of them highly persuasive, but what is interesting is the fact that wealthy, powerful, dominant social agents should feel compelled to produce anything like a sociodicy at all. What drives them to do it?

First, to minimize the shame of privilege, or what we might paradoxically term the dishonor of esteem or the symbolic taint of privilege. This feeling is certainly not universal but varies across time and place: Elites have at various times felt a lesser or greater compulsion to justify themselves. Russian oligarchs in London have been more at ease in flaunting their wealth, as Elizabeth Schimpfössl (2018) shows: The Austrian sociologist notes that “many wealthy Russians still primarily identify with and express themselves through conspicuous consumption, ostentation, and pomp.” The super-rich of Manhattan, on the other hand, have in recent decades shown signs of significant discomfort with their own privilege, prompting the sociologist Rachel Sherman (2017) to anatomize the “anxieties of affluence” wracking this class. A successful sociodicy soothes the powerful, assuaging their guilty conscience. 

Second, to stave off political opposition, radical reforms, or even revolutionary foment. A social order must make itself hegemonic, which means producing discourses of justification, preferably of the preemptive kind. Perhaps the most fitting rhetorical analogy is prolepsis, an argumentative move that anticipates counterarguments before they are made to bolster one’s own position. A successful sociodicy nips radical dissent in the bud, offering a justificatory discourse to take the sting out of radical reforms or even revolutionism before they are able to ingratiate themselves.

Symbolic Power, Ideology, and Sociodicy

In short, sociodicies are the narratives of the dominant, imposed on the dominated, so that the dominant might continue to dominate. Any time a rich person says they are rich because they are especially intelligent or clever, or possess some other exceptional (achieved, not ascribed or inherited) personal characteristics—from fitness to charisma—they are in some sense “doing sociodicy.” When the poor are told that they are poor because they are unintelligent, lazy, immoral, or make poor decisions, they are on the receiving end of sociodicy.

Bourdieu thinks of neoliberalism as a sociodicy, and more specifically, that part of neoliberal doctrine purporting that “the economic and social world is structured by equations” in ways that erase the potential of human freedom and political agency (Bourdieu 1998: 35): “It is by arming itself with mathematics (and power over the media) that neo-liberalism has become the supreme form of the conservative sociodicy which started to appear some thirty years ago as ‘the end of ideology’, or more recently, as ‘the end of history’.” Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) idea that liberal capitalism was the only viable political-economic ideology in the post-Cold War era was itself a kind of sociodicy, because it justified whatever structures of power and domination that existed on grounds of historical necessity: There was literally no other alternative, to echo Thatcher’s famous phrase.

The concept of sociodicy is closely linked to another key notion in Bourdieu’s lexicon, symbolic power, denoting the imposition of categories, concepts, and organizing “principles of vision and division,” that is, ways of seeing and apportioning social resources or energies (in the broadest sense). We might think of sociodicy as a subtype of symbolic power. Symbolic power is the wider term, including any kind of group-making categorical division of the population.

The concept of sociodicy might seem overly catholic: Its wide scope suggests its semantic coverage bleeds over into the terminological landscape of keywords like “hegemony” or “ideology”; in his introductory textbook, Sociology, John Macionis defines ideology precisely as “cultural beliefs that justify particular social arrangements, including patterns of inequality” (2012: 231), echoing the definition of sociodicy outlined above. But ideology has a dozen other meanings besides, varying with whomever one asks, while sociodicy is undoubtedly more clear-cut and unequivocally defined. Ideology has been thought of in even wider terms (up to any kind of systematic idea about any sort of thing), while sociodicy more straightforwardly denotes justifications of the social order. 

The great value of sociodicy, then, lies in its emphasis on the idea that one of the key stakes in politics is whether the dominant will succeed in making that which is untenable appear not only good, but necessary. If sociodicy succeeds, what chance for freedom?

 

References

Aron, R. (2010). Mémoires (Edition intégrale inédite). Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont. 

Aron, R. (2023) Critique de la pensée sociologique: Cours au Collège de France (1970-1971 et 1971-1972). Paris: Odile Jacob.   

Bourdieu, P. (1998) Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of our Time. Cambridge: Polity Press. 

Bourdieu, P. (2000) Pascalian Meditations. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. (1999) The cunning of imperialist reason.

Cohen, A. (2023) “Raymond Aron, Pierre Bourdieu, and the Ford Foundation: Exploring the borderlands of human and social sciences at the Center for European Sociology.”

Elster, J. (1981) Snobs. London Review of Books. 5 November 1981. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v03/n20/jon-elster/snobs.

Elster, J. (1983) Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press.

Kleinman, A. (1997) ‘Everything That Really Matters’: Social Suffering, Subjectivity, and the Remaking of Human Experience in a Disordering World. Harvard Theological Review 90: 315-336.

Leibniz, G. W. (1710/1951) Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Macionis, J. J. (2012) Sociology (Fourteenth edition). Boston: Pearson.

Maitzen, S. (2009) Ordinary morality implies atheism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2: 107-126.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970) The German Ideology. New York: International Publishers.

Schimpfössl, E. (2018) Rich Russians: From Oligarchs to Bourgeoisie. Oxford University Press.

Schumpeter, J. A. (1951) Imperialism and Social Classes. New York: August M. Kelley.

Sherman, R. (2017) Uneasy Street: The Anxieties of Affluence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 

Swedberg, R., & Agevall, O. (2016) Theodicy (Theodizee). In: The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 347-348.

Van Inwagen, P. (2006) The Problem of Evil (The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wacquant, L. (2023) Carnal concepts in action: The diagonal sociology of Loïc Wacquant. Thesis Eleven DOI:10.1177/07255136221149782.

Weber, M. (1946) The social psychology of the world religions. In: H. H. Gerth, & C. Wright Mills (Eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (pp. 267-301). New York: Oxford University Press.

Covering the Field of Power: Lionel Barber’s 'Financial Times' Diaries 

Lionel Barber (2020). The Powerful and the Damned. London: WH Allen.

If one wants to understand power today, one could do a lot worse than reading former Financial Times editor Lionel Barber’s memoir-esque book, The Powerful and the Damned (2020). Sociologists like to think they understand power, but it is all too liable to be a power in the abstract; Barber, though writing polished prose in the retroactive style of a “diary” (he admits in the preface that he was not in the habit of keeping a diary during his 15 years’ tenure as FT editor, so the book is a backdated construction of sorts), produces a tantalizing glimpse into the personal relations and institutional fabric that undergird what we might term, following Bourdieu, the transnational field of power, a web of interconnected organizations, groups, and individuals who make up the upper echelons of financial, political, media, and even ecclesial power around the world. (Churchmen make their appearance several times throughout the book, often in unflattering proximity to the heavy-handed wielders of temporal power.) Though perhaps unsurprising to savvy social observers, Barber shows how power finally relies upon dense webs of personal relationships, constituted in the last instance by the interaction of flesh-and-blood individuals who mobilize money and words (or economic capital and symbolic power) to promote an agenda that they are not always in control nor even conscious of. And these webs of relations both enable and ensnare the operators of power, posing particular risks to journalists, who are always at risk of becoming caught up in the heady social games of the powerful, thereby forgetting their mission: the ceaseless, remorseless critique of power in the service of reducing social domination. All too often, however, Barber’s memoirs reveal how the media becomes a willing participant in relations of domination, not merely a bystander to but a willing participant in and party to the field of power, entranced by its interior privileges, spellbound by the gifts of the dominant, sometimes material, but often wholly symbolic (a gesture, a sign of deferral at the right time, a flattering invitation or visit, a sense of “belonging” to the club of the wealthy and esteemed). 

What Barber shows so convincingly, perhaps against himself, is how much of the transnational field of power relies upon what we might call the bribe, those “gifts” or conferrals of “grace” that bestow upon the recipient an at times unconscious sense of obligation, debt, and even fealty to the giver. No more so than in the journalistic field, it seems, which is of course Barber’s sole vantage point, writing as he does from his perch atop the mighty, global newspaper FT, whose competitors, Barber repeatedly notes, are not so much other UK newspapers like the Times or the Guardian, even if the Guardian’s long-time editor Alan Rusbridger at one point seems to inspire Barber to try harder in the critique of power, probably unsuccessfully, but rather global and partly online outlets: “our direct competitors – Bloomberg, the New York Times, Reuters and the Wall Street Journal” (p. 258).

To be a successful transnational media operator, like Barber, means entering into the rough-and-tumble of reciprocal (metaphorical, sometimes concrete) gift-giving, schmoozing, and close-up involvement with financial, economic, and political power-players. “Breakfast with [Cabinet secretary] Sir Jeremy Heywood at the Cinnamon Club” (p. 258); “To Clarence House for a second ‘get to know you’ meeting with Prince Charles” (p. 267); “I’m happy to escape for a couple of nights at the five-star Beau-Rivage Palace hotel in Lausanne on the edge of Lake Geneva, in my capacity as host of the FT’s annual Commodities Summit” (p. 286); “George Osborne has invited me to Downing Street for a pre-election-day conversation” (p. 289). And so on, and so on, for fifteen consecutive years. 

This mixing and mingling can only breed confusion—about the properly critical, and at the risk of sounding pathetic, watchdog role of the press. But Barber’s dilemma, who early on decides, unusually, to be a roving, roaming editor-writer, splitting his time between the London office and being out in the field interviewing powerful players—from Putin to Mohammed bin Salman to Theresa May (and one sense that his title smooths the way to interviewing these “movers and shakers”)—is that the bribe is in some sense the only way to “get by” in the transnational field of power. Taking the bribe, metaphorically speaking, is the only way to come along for the ride. The FT needs above all else access, which means obtaining early, semi-privileged information, or engaging in off-the-record background conversations that nevertheless inform or “color” the newspaper’s reporting or editorial stance, which means cultivating personal relationships, and which in turn demands throwing one’s whole personality and being into the ring of power.

The terrible truth is that there is no way to fully cover the field of power, journalistically speaking—going to the conferences, meetings, summits, doing the requisite interviews, snapping up the deep-background “color” and texture, which set papers of record like the FT apart from mere (and bland) news aggregators—without at the same time being coopted by the field of power. To write about the dominant, one must cultivate a personal relationship with the dominant, which appears to involve allowing them to infiltrate one’s being. In this sense there is something vaguely vampirical about business journalism (or reporting on power as such, for any lengthy, and therefore meaningful, time period). You can’t write about power without letting them sink their fangs into you, it would seem. Barber recounts how, right after Brexit, he is awarded France’s Légion d’Honneur, which British tabloids perhaps rightly understand as a kind of reward for trying to stave off Brexit (the FT was a Remainer outlet), and for the award ceremony “at the ambassador’s residence on ‘Billionaire’s Row’ in Notting Hill Gate,” Mario Draghi himself, flies in “quietly from Frankfurt” to be in attendance. “[T]his honour may have come from a foreign government, but it means a lot to me” (p. 341). As well it should, signaling the hug of death by a section of the field of power; no sufficiently critical reporter would ever accept a “prize” of this nature amidst one of their home country’s most fundamental socio-political struggles (i.e. Brexit) in decades. 

At one point, Barber writes about the FT’s many “conferences” and how they “contained in-built conflicts between our duties as inquiring journalists and our responsibilities as event organisers,” which “required constant monitoring to ensure things did not become too cosy” (p. 287). But could not the same conflict be said to exist between reporting on the field and (therefore) participating in the field of power? The field of power exercises a kind of black-hole gravitational pull, sucking all bystanders into its event horizon. No matter one’s bulldog inclinations, the most hard-boiled reporter cannot withstand the allure, temptation, and flattery of unadorned Power. The proximity to power becomes a drug, a far more addictive cocktail than mere alcohol or narcotics, which are after all chemical intoxicants, unmatched by the sheer power of social intoxication. The “flattery” implicit in being chauffeured around the Saudi royal family’s palatial complex, the “flattery” of having to complain about endless rounds of jet-lag, the flattery of being addressed by the new British Prime Minister Theresa May on a first-name basis, the flattery of meeting on casually amicable terms with the then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, “who preferred sofa talk,” or David Cameron, “who liked to banter with chums” (p. 333), or who offers “a gracious thank-you for sticking with the Tories through austerity” (p. 289). Through no real fault of his own, Barber discloses the intimacy and rapport, the “palliness,” that spontaneously arises between members of the field of power, unless they maintain an absolute and almost super-human social vigilance, premised on the critique of power and reduction of social domination, elevated to the kind of civic duty that is in short supply in this book’s pages. 

We read newspaper headlines daily, but rarely see the relations of power that go into their formation. What Lionel Barber’s book does quite well, perhaps in spite of itself, is draw back the veil on this process of symbolic production. Who will guard the guardians—when the guardians seem so content to stay in five-star hotels, jet around the world, attend banquets with the rich and powerful, and hang on their every word? Being a power-player like Barber was for years is no doubt hard work, and this book is filled with recollections of what must at times have been nearly back-breaking labor and excruciatingly long hours; but one wonders whether the press as reported on in these pages, and especially that part of the press devoted to financial and political power is not, finally, itself a part of the problem—and not the solution. Perhaps the implicit criticism here is asking too much of the FT, which is hardly a left-wing paper. But Barber’s decade-and-a-half-long stint at the apex of one of the world’s most influential media outlets serves as a reminder that behind every headline, there is a flesh-and-blood encounter between individuals; and this relation, necessary to generate information, is itself a risk, giving rise to a potential for affinities and proximities that threaten to impinge upon the deployment of media power.

The powerful know all too well the power of the press and will do a great deal to keep it in obeisance; to resist their charms, it would seem, takes more than we see on offer in these pages.

The Credible Nonsense Propensity (CNP) of Artificial Intelligence

OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 is one of the consummate promulgators of apparently meaningful nonsense on the Web today. Roughly speaking, it generates output on the basis of a predictive model, where each next word is probabilistically produced on the basis of preceding words. It joins together words that seem like they would make sense together. The problem with this approach is that when it comes to concrete things in reality, such as titles of works, the AI sometimes produces lists of items that are merely plausible-sounding rather than really-existing. For the serious student or scholar, this means entering dangerous territory: Any number of creative works could exist, after all, but what matters more often is whether they in fact exist.

Let’s look at an example. I asked the AI to “[p]roduce a list of twenty articles or essays on Hegel's relationship to or ideas on Christianity that I should read and are available online.” ChatGPT produced the following list of 13 items before bugging out:

  1. "Hegel's Philosophy of Christianity" by Stephen Houlgate

  2. "Hegel and Christianity" by Laurence Dickey

  3. "The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Philosophy" by Frederick G. Whelan

  4. "Hegel's Theological Turn: A Comparative Study of His Early Jena and Later Berlin Manuscripts" by Paul K. Moser

  5. "Hegel and the Problem of Evil" by Robert Stern

  6. "Hegel on Christ and the Christian Religion" by Peter C. Hodgson

  7. "Hegel's Religious Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation" by Laurence Dickey

  8. "Hegel's Interpretation of Christianity" by Laurence Dickey

  9. "Hegel's Dialectic of Religion and Philosophy" by David L. Johnsen

  10. "The Role of Religion in Hegel's Philosophy" by Andrew Buchwalter

  11. "Hegel's Concept of God and Its Relevance for Today" by John McCumber

  12. "Hegel's Concept of the Divine" by Robert C. Solomon

  13. "Hegel's Aesthetics and the Christian Tradition" by David Kolb

Now, for anyone outside of the field of Hegel studies, this list must appear highly plausible; and indeed, all of these titles look like they could very well be highly interesting works. The problem, however, is that none of them are real as stated in their current form. The first listed author, Stephen Houlgate, is a very real, and eminent, Hegel scholar, but he has, to the best of my bibliographical knowledge, never penned an article entitled “Hegel’s Philosophy of Christianity.” Item number 10, “The Role of Religion in Hegel's Philosophy,” is the title of a really-existing book chapter, but in a volume authored by Raymond Keith Williamson, not the listed Andrew Buchwalter. The eleventh title, “Hegel's Concept of God and Its Relevance for Today,” is pure fiction—though, again, one might very well want to read a work by that title.

I tried to remedy what we might call ChatGPT’s credible nonsense propensity (CNP) by asking the AI to include DOIs or URLs in the next prompt, a kind of feeble attempt at introducing certain standards of accountability: “Produce a list of twenty articles or essays on Hegel's relationship to or ideas on Christianity that I should read and are available online. Include DOI links or URLs.”

Here’s what came out on the other end (ChatGPT aborted after six items):

  1. "Hegel and the Problem of Christian Ethics" by William Desmond (https://doi.org/10.1163/156916202760667748)

  2. "Hegel and Christian Theology" by David J. Wood (https://doi.org/10.1163/1569162054444361)

  3. "Hegel's Philosophy of Christianity" by Philip J. Kain (https://doi.org/10.1163/1569162042600230)

  4. "Hegel's Critique of Christianity: The Rejection of the Christian Doctrine of God" by Andrew Pessin (https://doi.org/10.1163/156916203322996561)

  5. "Hegel's Theology and the Role of Christianity in Modern Society" by John E. Toews (https://doi.org/10.1163/156916205774968386)

  6. "Hegel's Concept of God: An Analysis of the Concept's Development and Implications" by Timothy J. Stapleton (https://doi.org/10.1163/156916203322537345)

But ChatGPT would not be deterred from falsity: the DOIs are also fake. The AI is, in other words, an accomplished fibber. Even when asked to introduce a kind of referential standard by which the authenticity of its output might be checked, at least in its present state (GPT-3.5), it shamelessly revels in artifice: Pursuing any of the links will immediately result in a “DOI Not Found” message. (DOI stands for a Document Object Identifier, a universal indexing tool used in academia to keep track of scholarly or scientific work.)

So what’s going on here? Most if not all of the authors listed above are real scholars of German idealism, continental philosophy, and/or Hegel. But the titles and links are all either fake, “misauthored” (i.e. the title exists somewhere, in some form, but not by the listed author), or—more frequently—simply made up on the basis of plausible-sounding patterns of collocated terms. Thus, “Hegel's Critique of Christianity: The Rejection of the Christian Doctrine of God,” though bombastic, could very well be a (cranky) reading of the great German philosopher’s take on Lutheran Protestantism. But in reality—and this is the more important question—it is not. It does not exist. 

It would be foolish to insist this erroneous type of output couldn’t be corrected in future iterations by some technological wizardry, but we see here, I think, the limits of AI in its present state. OpenAI’s model in its current shape and form is less good at telling us things about the world in its current state—how the world is. But it is quite good at telling us about the world in its potential state—suggestively signalling to us how it might be.

When used correctly, AI can be highly generative, serving as an auxiliary to human-centered intellectual labor, a mere appendage to human reasoning activities. Anyone working in the specialist field of Hegel studies, for instance, could take the list of 19 titles above, subtracting those that are merely mislabelled, and find inspiration for the title of their next paper. AI tools like ChatGPT are not the author replaced, but more like an author’s amanuensis, assisting in bringing the virtual world of potentiality into being.

The hinterland of social democracy: On the conceptual limits of Nordic welfare capitalism

ABSTRACT: Every instantiation of decommodifying welfare capitalism relies on a hinterland, an exterior space or world for which commodification remains the rule whose function is to service the interiority of social-democratic welfarism. Taking Norway as its case study, this article unfolds the notion of a protective “cupola,” following Žižek, and a “centaur state,” following Wacquant, as the preeminent political-economic innovations of late-modern social democracy. While extracting resources, cheap labor, goods, and financial profits from the global hinterland, the welfare-capitalist state privileges its national citizenry, and, despite significant neoliberal transformation, continues to protect the populace from the discomfiting effects and vagaries of the market, albeit at the expense of the world beyond its bounds. Social democracy, then, hinges on the preservation of difference, and fails to offer a truly global, universal solution to the commodifying effects of market capitalism.

Introduction

Social democracy—and its related (inverted) invariant, democratic socialism—is enjoying a period of significant global interest. More particularly, and perhaps unlike ever before in its history, the Nordic model of embedded welfare capitalism is experiencing a worldwide publicity boost, powered and projected by rising dissatisfaction with the deleterious effects of unfettered market capitalism. In the post-Global Financial Crisis era, laissez-faire capitalism is looking increasingly unsavory, a tendency only amplified by the lethality of the COVID-19 pandemic and the potentially cataclysmic effects of catastrophic climate change, which will demand a substantial, coordinated state response.

Writing in 2013, a lead writer for The Economist noted that “the four main Nordics—Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland—are doing rather well,” before adding: “If you had to be reborn anywhere in the world as a person with average talents and income, you would want to be a Viking.”[1] What this centrist magazine found so appealing in the Nordic model of social democracy was its “proving that it is possible to combine competitive capitalism with a large state.” Capitalism was not destined to be unbound, the Nordic countries seemed to suggest.

While neoliberalism long seemed like the only viable political-economic game in town, enjoying spectacular doxic appeal since the era of Reagan and Thatcher, the financial meltdown of 2007-2008 seemed to sound the death knell of this rather cozy state of affairs: The hegemony of the Washington Consensus was bruised by an economic meltdown wiping out an estimated $9.8 trillion worth of home equity in the United States alone,[2] and which had gone largely unforeseen by the vast majority of professional economists. The naturalized ideological grip of the pseudo-discipline of economics seemed, at least, to weaken, causing the once self-assured Alan Greenspan to pronounce in 2009 that “the whole intellectual edifice…collapsed in the summer of last year.”[3] Faced with quickly diminishing life prospects, induced by the subprime mortgage crash, the post-2008 era has been characterized by a kind of ideological restlessness—one in which Fukuyama’s triumphalist liberal-democratic capitalist “end of history” thesis looks increasingly implausible—a fact only heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic and, far more dangerously, an increasingly hot and hostile planet.

On the one hand, COVID-19 forced even the most staunchly market-liberal politicians to admit that the basic mechanisms of market-bound life would have to be checked: In the U.S., nearly $5 trillion were devoted to “pandemic stimulus” efforts—a euphemism for the state temporarily (and, it must be added, inadequately) disconnecting life chances from a market existence—with workers alone receiving almost $700 billion unemployment benefits. One Chicago economist noted, in the words of the New York Times, that “unrestricted cash…was used broadly by the federal government to stem the economic devastation” created by SARS-CoV-2.[4]

Across the Atlantic, in a very different kind of society, Norway, the government spent nearly 260 billion Norwegian krone (approximately 26 billion dollars[5]) between 2020 and 2022 on various pandemic measures, with 109 billion krone transferred to private corporations, aimed at compensating for revenue losses.[6] The state also directly intervened on behalf of wage-earners, processing some 617,000 applications for compensatory daily wage allowances (dagpenger)—a significant proportion in an economy whose work force consists of around three million individuals[7]—suggesting that, as in so many other Western countries, the fundamental axiom of market capitalism, viz. that life chances are intimately connected with the imperative to sell wage-labor, would have to be disabled with the advent of a generalized societal crisis that threatened to undermine not only social reproduction (that is, a continued belief in the viability of the capitalist structure), but the very biological life-force ultimately underpinning value production and, therefore, capital accumulation.[8]

If anything, global climate change seems to demand even heavier state-centered action, perhaps necessitating a kind of “war communism,” as Malm (2020) suggests, including consumption quotas and production bans (on particularly resource-intensive goods and services), with the ramped-up normalization of direct intervention in the economy at a scale hitherto precluded by liberal economics. Žižek (2020), too, used this combative phrase—historically denoting the severe measures taken by Soviet Russia during the Civil War between 1918 and 1921, when it faced the prospect of existential destruction by the combined forces of Western Europe and the “Whites”—in the context of an early intervention on the topic of how best to address the pandemic in the early days of 2020; Žižek observed that even Trump’s actions to “limit the freedom of private enterprises” were in some sense “socialist” or could even be construed as a kind of “Communism” (2020: 93). This conceptual echo is suggestive of how the COVID-19 pandemic perhaps served as a premonition of an even greater coming crisis—and the scale of ideological transformation this necessarily will require.

Indeed, the history of the early twenty-first century may someday be written through this lens of ideological unsettling: a tripartite movement of global financial crisis, global pandemic, and planetary-wide climate crisis, each serving to undermine or even, in the final analysis, explode neoliberal orthodoxies. What remains certain is that one cannot go home again: There can be no return to the comfortable Clintonite vision of liberal markets only minimally corrected by a bare-bones regulatory state, with working people left to fend for themselves. The crisis-pocked “long decade” of 2007-2022 has permanently upset the natural order of all things political-economic.

The imaginary of Nordic welfare capitalism

Much of the consequent casting-about for new ideas and structures in the post-Washington Consensus era, it must be said, has been channeled into the resurgence of more traditionally nativist, at times authoritarian, right-wing politicians and movements, mischaracterized as “populist” (as if their cardinal sin were an over-reliance on the populus, on public sway over policy, or untrammeled democracy)—item, Trump’s Muslim bans and immigration raids; item, Johnson’s dysfunctional Brexiteering (with Johnson aptly sorted under the category of political strongmen by the Financial Times reporter Gideon Rachman [2022]); item, Bolsonaro’s pro-business-Evangelical assault on the Amazon rainforest and COVID protective measures.

Simultaneously, however, there has been an opposite (and unequal) reaction, less electorally successful, certainly, though significant at the level of ideas: a corresponding boom in concern with constructing an ameliorated mode of political economy, a “capitalism with a human face.” In the United States, the Democratic Socialists of America, once a marginal group, now boast of 92,000 members; Bernie Sanders, its well-known associate, received more than 9 million votes in the 2020 Democratic primary elections. Decommodification looks increasingly popular. Among Democrats and “Democratic leaners,” some 65 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll reported a “positive image of socialism” in 2021,[9] astonishing given the level of ideological vehemence directed toward collectivist notions in the American public imaginary. In the United Kingdom, the leftwing Jeremy Corbyn was able to climb to the apex of the Labour Party in 2015, albeit not without concerted opposition, ultimately leading to his toppling five years later. But his ideas remain attractive. In 2021, a public opinion poll of young people in the UK suggested that 67 percent of respondents would “like to live in a socialist system,” with three-quarters agreeing that climate change is a “specifically capitalist problem” while “blam[ing] capitalism for Britain’s housing crisis” and supporting the notion that socialism is a “good idea” that has had the misfortune of being “badly done.”[10]

There is a natural desire to see one’s ideals realized in concrete terms. Real-world confirmation helps bolster the credibility of what some might otherwise suspect are unrealizable ideals. For a host of reasons, various post-neoliberal malcontents have fastened onto the Scandinavian model. The mantra, “Look to Scandinavia!”, has resounded in one shape or another in public policy circles, legislative chambers, and journalism—as with George Lakey’s 2017 pop-economic book, Viking Economics: How the Scandinavians Got It Right, or as seen in the filmmaker Michael Moore’s 2015 documentary, Where to Invade Next; Moore visits a Norwegian minimum-security island prison, Bastøy, portrayed as but one particular (penal) instantiation of a deeper, more functional method of organizing state and society.[11] Similarly, in April 2022, Senator Bernie Sanders, then chairman of the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, invited Norway’s ambassador in Washington, D.C. to a virtual summit on the topic, “What can we learn from Norway?”.[12] Sanders expressed astonishment at such minutiae of this Nordic country’s healthcare system, wherein patients’ annual spending on prescription medication is capped at around 350 US dollars. The senator expressed a desire to learn from Norway, to reconstruct, in the American context, “a government that works for all, not just those at the top.”

The Scandinavian, or Nordic, countries—the nomenclature is often inconsistently applied—seem, in short, to offer a ready example of ethical capitalism, a space in which the “corruption of capitalism,” to use Standing’s (2016) phrase, has at least partly been redressed. The lesson of Scandinavia is, seemingly, that market economies can function not just in the interest of the owners of private enterprise, but the wider public, ensconcing capital’s movements in welfarist packages, capable of delivering reasonable or free public healthcare, schools, higher education, and childcare, inter alia, while offering a panoply of unemployment, sickness, and disability benefits to guard against various existential risks. These are, of course, not insignificant gains. Just as enthusiasts of the Nordic prison systems cheer on its tendency toward humane carceral conditions and reasonably low rates of imprisonment (see e.g. Pratt and Eriksson 2013), so too, more broadly, do enthusiasts of Nordic political economy applaud what one American columnist—slyly echoing and subverting Deng Xiaoping’s famed phrase—refers to as “capitalism with Scandinavian characteristics.”[13] Writing in Foreign Policy, Nima Sanandaji rightly points out that while Scandinavian societies are often held aloft as exemplars of practicable “socialism,” the reality on the ground is that they offer a demonstration of what the author calls centrism, essentially denoting a commitment to core capitalist values, encapsulated within a framework of taxation, modest redistribution, various assistive institutions, and an assortment of social safeguards.[14]

The Nordic neoliberal counter-revolution

In his preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel famously claimed that “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the coming of the dusk” (cit. Blackburn 2016: 346). By this somewhat cryptic remark, the German philosopher meant that philosophy—or, more broadly, perhaps any kind of organized discursive reflectiveness—always arrives on the social scene too late, as it were, catching up to phenomena precisely as they begin to wither away. Only with maturity unto decay, Hegel claims, can serious thought begin to comprehend that which is falling apart.

Similarly, the paradox of look-to-Scandinavianism is that the rest of the world seems to be catching up to Nordic welfare capitalism at precisely the moment in its history when its decommodifying, welfarist credentials have fallen under the sway of rising neoliberal headwinds. To borrow Hegel’s terms, dusk is approaching on intently decommodifying welfarism. Take the example of public healthcare: Norway’s much-lauded public healthcare system, long considered a rival to the UK’s National Health Service (NHS), increasingly faces competition from the rise of private health insurance providers and healthcare subcontractors. While only around 29,000 individuals were covered by private health insurance schemes in Norway in 2003, this figure has climbed steadily and rapidly across the ensuing decades, to a level of more than 696,000 individuals by 2021.[15] One must be careful not to exaggerate the role played by private providers in a country that devoted some 17.9 percent of public spending on healthcare in 2021.[16] However, that same year, some 14.4 percent of health spending was derived from private sources, a clear sign that cracks in the system were beginning to appear—slowly and moderately, to be sure—as social elites increasingly desired “choice” and “flexibility” as well as the freedom to skip ahead of others in an often-backlogged public system of specialist consultancies.[17] Even government agencies recognize this nascent privatization: The Norwegian Directorate of Health (Helsedirektoratet) spoke in December 2020 of an “emerging market for privately funded services (?),” during a presentation of Norway’s system—admittedly with a tantalizing parenthetical question mark appended.[18] Aleris, Norway’s largest private provider of healthcare services, remained outspoken in support of state provision—“The public [sector] should still be responsible for providing good health services to the population,” it claimed, staking out an auxiliary role for its service provision[19]—even as it generated revenues of more than 1.1 billion NOK in 2021,[20] and the market for private health insurance looked likely to continue along its past 20-year trajectory of year-on-year growth.

Or take that much-vaunted pillar of social-democratic ideology, egalitarianism. Between 2012 and 2018, Norway saw its top 1 percent wealthiest individuals move from controlling 18.52 percent of wealth in 2012 to 22.67 percent in 2018—a moderate increase, but from an already highly unequal baseline, especially for a country that prides itself on its egalitarian credentials; the country’s top 10 percent wealthiest individuals went from controlling 50.09 percent of wealth to 53.84 percent of the country’s riches, a moderate increase, but again, suggestive of a durable, fundamental wealth inequality at the core of this putatively equality-oriented nation,[21] indicative of a direction of change, an ongoing society-wide trajectory away from a more intensely interventionist, decommodifying, redistributive postwar brand of social democracy. Meanwhile, the bottom 50 percent of the population’s net personal wealth stood at a meager 3.6 percent in 2021.[22]

In fact, like all postindustrialized societies, Norway has fostered a significant, self-assertive wealthy elite—albeit one increasingly given to offshoring their wealth, as in the case of the billionaire Kjell Inge Røkke, who announced in September 2022 that he was relocating to Lugano, Switzerland, putatively due to its “central location” on the European continent,[23] though more likely as a result of Switzerland’s status as a tax haven, extensively documented by the Berkeley economist Gabriel Zucman (2015) and others. Norway, too, houses a significant proportion of the population with limited access to the nation’s great riches. The relative egalitarianism of the Nordics in comparison with the rest of the postindustrialized world only suggest that this world is, overall, a rather unequally distributed space, with the Nordics playing the part of a somewhat less (internally) unequal, but still unequally distributed, cluster of societies. Even here, though, one must allow for certain caveats: As Aaberge et al. (2021: 89-90) point out, there are number of definitional and accounting issues at stake that have caused official Gini coefficients and wealth data to underestimate the real extent of wealth inequality in Norway; they find, for instance, that constructing what they hold to be a more accurate estimate of the value of unlisted private companies reveals greater wealth inequality than previously assumed. Between 2011 and 2021, the pro-business journal Kapital estimated that the top 400 Norwegian billionaires (counted in NOK, equivalent to approximately 100 million dollars) more than tripled their total wealth in nominal terms, from a total of around 530 billion NOK to 1,696 billion NOK.[24] Meanwhile, more than one in ten children were reported to be growing up in families with “durably low income” levels in 2021, more than a threefold increase since 2001.[25] With rising energy and food prices and rising interest rates in 2022, a nationwide network of eight food banks estimated it would hand out 5,000 tons of food by the end of the year, a 30 percent increase from the year prior.[26]

The (national) limits of social democracy

Social democracy is, ultimately, not a global solution to the problem of decommodification presented by market capitalism, because it, too, relies fundamentally on the production and exploitation of difference, albeit typically spatially distanced difference-making. Social democracy hinges on axes of spatial differentiation, by which cheap labor, goods, services, and natural resources can flow to service the national citizenry ensconced within the nationally bounded engine of decommodification that is the social-democratic welfare state. In this sense, social democracy is always a kind of quasi-“socialism in one country,” an attempt to redress the ills of a multinational, indeed global, system of production, distribution, and accumulation, but within the framework of a single nation-state, which naturally demands a sorting between citizen-insiders (worthy of decommodification, protection, assistance) and second-rate outsiders (whose function is to produce, accumulate for, and service these insiders). Social democracy creates, to use Žižek’s term, inspired by Sloterdijk, a cupola, a kind of dome, protecting insiders from outside disruption, or a membrane, filtering away harms and risks while allowing, like a semi-permeable membrane, desirable flows of resources, and social energy, to pass undisturbed into the relatively comfortably ensconced insiders within.

Social democracy—understood as decommodified welfare capitalism, which seeks to curtail socioecononomic inequalities, provide relatively generous public services, such as free healthcare and education, and protect citizens from the vagaries of the market—can only function within circumscribed national or, at best, regional pockets. Social democracy is not properly speaking a realizable globalist ideology, but a kind of “democratic socialism in one country” (or a minor group of countries). The reasons are largely structural in nature: It is not the “welfare” modifier that hinders a globally distributed social democracy from forming, but the grammatical subject, “capitalism”: It demands spatial differentiation, trading on difference—differences in needs, desires, capacities, resources, and resilience, which ultimately produce the differences in exploitability that are the precondition for value-production. The homogenization of life chances implied in an actual, realized internationalist social-democratic vision would effectively close off the spatially differentiated avenues of difference-engendered capital accumulation.

Conceptually speaking, Nordic social democracy depends for its sustenance on a vast, exploitable hinterland: a fount of commodifying relations and services extracted via global market mechanisms, whose function under political-economic dualization is to service and ameliorate the life chances of a nationally privileged citizenry. By its nature, social democracy is premised on the power asymmetries inherent to the core-periphery structure of the world economy.

Like Wacquant’s (2009: 43-44) “centaur state”—liberal and permissive at the top (toward social elites), punitive and austere toward inhabitants of the lower end of social space—social democracy privileges and protects a national citizenry, ensconced within a privileged bubble, or cupola, where relatively decommodified social relations and generous social assistance still hold sway; but this is the “human half” of the social-democratic centaur. Its beastly visage remains in place, too. It shows its human face to the nation-state to which it hails; it reserves its animal nature for the hinterland that stretches on behind the welfarist nation.

Flexible, inexpensive foreign labor

By the end of 2020, 8.4 percent of the total employed labor force was constituted by foreign laborers, according to Statistics Norway.[27] Some sectors, such as the construction industry, were heavily reliant on nondomestic sources labor: In the building trade, the proportion of foreign workers was 22 percent, and in the hospitality sector this figure stood at 16 percent; one-quarter of all temporarily “rented” manpower (an industry labeled forretningsmessig tjenesteyting, or “corporate services,” by Statistics Norway) was made up of overseas workers.[28] In a study of resident workers from Poland and Lithuania—two important sources of labor importation following the 2004 eastward expansion of the EU—social scientists found that “there are clear indications that the majority of our sample” are paid more than the relevant minimum, or “tariff,” wage in the construction industry, even though more than one-third of Polish respondents and one-quarter of workers from Lithuania believed they were underpaid compared with their Norwegian coworkers (Ødegård and Andersen 2021: 5).

The hundreds of thousands of service workers sourced from lower-wage countries like Poland in the decades after the EU’s expansion served to generate value at a scale that would not have been possible with native labor alone. “The new labour migration flows,” observes Friberg (2017: 20) of the early 2000s, “represented a major shock to parts of the Norwegian labour market. Overnight, Norwegian employers in industries struggling with labour shortages and volatile demand gained access to a vast reservoir of cheap flexible labour in countries with wage-levels somewhere between one-fifth and one-tenth of Norway’s.” Friberg rightly points out that “this new large-scale labor migration flow has been positive for the Norwegian economy,” though with a more acutely political-economy lens, we might rephrase this in terms of a foreign labor pool’s function as a source of extraordinary value production and profitability for a small class of business owners. Indeed, this class-systemic function can be seen even in the upper echelons of the Norwegian political establishment: Norway’s social-democratic—and personally wealthy—Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre sold his ownership stakes in a construction site in 2017 after it was discovered that foreign workers working on the site were working without “tariff” agreements, on so-called casual labor contracts (løsarbeiderkontrakter);[29] Støre’s profits from the unplanned sale—undertaken to avoid further criticism of his role as Labor Party leader—netted him around 3 million NOK in profits.[30]

Of course, the hinterland of social democracy can supply the means necessary for welfare capitalism to reproduce itself by other means than brute labor importation. In 2021, China became Norway’s largest importing partner, with around 13 percent of imports arriving from China this year,[31] though outmatched by Germany and Sweden in the pre-pandemic year of 2019.[32] The world at large also presents ready opportunities for investment activities, from Statoil’s investments in ecologically destructive tar sand projects in Canada for a decade until 2016, when it felt impelled to pull out after massive criticism,[33] to an extensive Norwegian corporate presence in Brazil, in which only a measly 10.5 percent of Norwegian subsidiaries’ total profits, or “more than US$ 750 million,” as one boastful government pamphlet proclaims, were reinvested between 2019 and 2020.[34]

Global rentiers, national welfarists

Financialization is perhaps the premier route along which social-democratic welfare capitalism demonstrates its cupola-like nature—its dualizing, centaur-like tendencies. In the case of Norway, the government’s hydrocarbon-fueled “sovereign wealth fund,” the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), colloquially known as the Norwegian Oil Fund, has effectively turned every citizen of the country into a part-time rentier capitalist: wage-laborers by daytime, portfolio watchers by night—class-fragmented dividuals, to use Deleuze’s term, rather than one-class subjectivities. The fund’s valuation and scale necessarily vary, but in 2021 it was valued at 12.3 trillion NOK (approximately 1.2 trillion dollars) and held ownership stakes in around 9,000 companies around the world: “On average the fund owns 1.3 percent of all listed companies,” Norway’s central bank reports, [35] an astonishing figure for a nation of around 5.5 million people, representing a vastly disproportionate level of property ownership on a global level: Norway’s share of the world population is only approximately 0.07 percent, meaning its holdings in global equity markets constitute a nearly 18-fold level of disproportion, compared with a perfectly egalitarian situation.

In short, Norway’s welfare capitalism is to a significant degree premised on its government’s position as a leading actor on financial markets: Between 2019 and 2021 alone, the government transferred 1.033 trillion NOK from the fund to bolster public spending.[36] Importantly, the fund is itself propped up by oil and gas revenues from Norway’s offshore hydrocarbon industry. The extraction of revenue from the fund is—in theory—capped at three percent of its total value (the fund’s assumed rate of return on investment in the long run). But these natural resource revenues are, as it were, always-already financialized before they can be turned to public use.

While adherents of the fund are quick to point out that the fund has staved off the problem of a resource curse, or “Dutch disease,” far less analytic firepower has been trained on parsing the extent to which it effectively connects each Norwegian citizen, and the state as a whole, to the future well-being of global financial capitalism—and indeed allows the country to exert an outsize force within this system. As one news report emphasizes, “The fund holds the equivalent of $244,000 for every Norwegian man, woman and child.”[37] Norway’s sovereign wealth fund has effectively turned its social-democratic host nation into an apex rentier capitalist. Now, in a liberal economic paradigm, in which financial markets serve a necessary auxiliary function in the world economy, smoothing the way for efficient production and trade, this is an ethico-politically neutral, or even benevolent, move. But within a critical-theoretical framework, in which growing financialization represents a turn to fictitious capital (Durand 2017), financial profits must ultimately have their source in some other space than the financial market itself. “Since finance does not itself produce anything, it must draw its fruits from elsewhere,” as Durand (2007: 153) writes.

Two issues should be raised here: On the one hand, dividends are effectively a form of surplus-value, generated by workers and appropriated by owners. On the other hand, the gargantuan increase in financial markets as such has “equitized” the global economy in such a way that future crashes, dislocations, and inequalities seem ever more likely. Moreover, to participate in financialization is in itself to partake of a concerted “economic and social restructuring,” as Ben Fine (2013: 59) writes, who argues that “as long as financialization remains hegemonic, so will be neoliberalism.” This is not the place to rehearse the case against financialization more extensively; suffice it to say that it remains incompatible with a truly internationalist concern with decommodification, welfarism, and democratic values. “Financialized capitalism,” writes Nancy Fraser (2015: 179), “is the era of ‘governance without government’—which is to say, of domination without the fig leaf of consent.”

A sovereign wealth fund such as Norway’s “Oil Fund”—funded in part, lest one forgets, by planet-destroying hydrocarbon production—creates a class of owners, rentiers, insiders, whose life-chances are now intimately connected with the solidification of the financialized paradigm, and whose well-being is now codetermined by the ability to appropriate value from workers and extract resources from the environment, while de- and reregulating the polity to coalesce with the interests of financial capital. The extensive revenue streams thus generated facilitate the reproduction of a nationally-bounded welfarist regime, certainly, even in times of crisis and pandemic—but at the “loss of its own soul,” that is, at the expense of everyone else. The downside to “gaining the whole world”—

or rather, a significant, outsize chunk of global equity markets—is that comfortable insiders are thereby left exposed to the vagaries of fictitious capital, including the possibility of global financial meltdown. Global financial markets become another necessary, exploitable element in the hinterland of social democracy, serving to prop up the welfare state’s myriad fiscal commitments for insiders.

Conclusion

Neoliberalism has reached Norway, too. The national oil and gas company, Statoil (now rebranded Equinor), was partly privatized in 2001 and listed on the New York and Oslo stock exchanges, even though the Norwegian government remains a two-thirds majority owner;[38] still, high levels of production taxation mean that, stunningly, around 42 percent of the state’s revenues are derived from the petroleum sector.[39] This is one of the key pillars of a hybridized state-capitalist system, which does ultimately generate welfare for its interior citizenry. Nevertheless, the welfare capitalism of the 2020s is not that of the postwar decades. There is an increasingly self-assertive, wealthy class of property owners that remains materially divorced from the rest of the populace: In 2019 alone, some 7.2 percent of the population received dividend payments from share ownership to the tune of around 63.35 billion NOK;[40] during the years of Conservative Prime Minister Erna Solberg’s government, from 2013 to 2021, the number of individuals classed as billionaires (in Norwegian krone) increased 2.5 times, from 161 to 400 individuals.[41] This interior class antagonism, within one society, which social-democratic ideology looks increasingly unlikely to tamp down, is simultaneously being replicated, fractal-like between the nation-state and the rest of the world, with the entire Norwegian social order increasingly becoming tied to the fortunes of global financial capitalism.

All of this makes for a highly ambivalent, ambiguous regime of political economy. It can variously be described as a form of dualization, as a centaur, or a cupola. Whatever one’s metaphor of choice: There is, on the one hand, an extant, but diminishing, system of decommodification reserved for a privileged interior population—securing free or relatively inexpensive education, childcare, and healthcare as well as reasonably generous social-security benefits and pensions—aimed at protecting a privileged, honorable citizenry from the shame and taint of life on the free market. But on the other hand, this system depends on an outside, an exteriority: a financialized world market, increasingly beholden to the vagaries of “fictitious capital”; a world market ready to supply cheap imported consumer goods, especially in East Asia; a source of inexpensive, docile labor drawn especially from the regions into which the European Union has expanded in recent decades; and, finally, a biosphere to be ravaged by hydrocarbon consumption, for which Norway is uniquely responsible with its decades of super-profitable extractive activities. If this is welfare capitalism, one shudders to contemplate its opposite.

In Plato’s Timaeus, Socrates describes his ideal guardians as persons both “spirited and philosophical,” so that they might be “appropriately gentle or harsh” (Plato 1997: 1226), whatever the circumstances might require. Is not this a model for welfare capitalism fused onto the nation-state—“gentle” toward insiders, “spirited” toward all that stretches beyond? Indeed, the iron law of social democracy—so benevolently disposed toward its own demos, so indifferent to or extractive of the wider kosmos—is such that for every welfare-capitalist regime, there must exist a hinterland, a “back country” of serviceable, willing inferiors (whether explicitly defined as such or not), of receptive markets, of a natural environment deemed valueless and undeserving of protection, ready to meet the needs, at once material and symbolic, of the glass dome’s privileged insiders.

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Pratt, J. & Eriksson, A. (2013) Contrasts in Punishment: An Explanation of Anglophone Excess and Nordic Exceptionalism. New York: Routledge.

Rachman, G. (2022) The Age of the Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy Around the World. New York: Other Press.

Standing, G. (2016) The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay.

Wacquant, L. (2009) Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham: Duke University Press.

Žižek, S. (2020) PANDEMIC! COVID-19 Shakes the World. New York: OR Books.

Zucman, G. (2015) The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ødegaard, A. M. & Andersen, R. K (2021) “Arbeids- og levekår for bosatte arbeidsinnvandrere fra Polen og Litauen.” Fafo-rapport, 2021:14. https://www.fafo.no/images/pub/2021/20781.pdf.


Footnotes

[1] https://www.economist.com/leaders/2013/02/02/the-next-supermodel

[2] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-guide-to-the-financial-crisis--10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html

[3] https://foreignpolicy.com/gt-essay/the-end-of-economics-fareed-zakaria/

[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/10/business/economy/guaranteed-income.html

[5] Calculated at the NOK-USD exchange rate valid on 14 September, 2022.

[6] https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7f1fdef23b72488da28fde24416425e6/20220405_holden-iv_hovedrapport.pdf, p. 90, Table 6.3.

[7] https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/sysselsetting/statistikk/arbeidskraftundersokelsen

[8] https://www.pengenytt.no/riksrevisjonen-nav-har-i-all-hovedsak-levert-under-koronapandemien/

[9] https://news.gallup.com/poll/357755/socialism-capitalism-ratings-unchanged.aspx

[10] https://iea.org.uk/media/67-per-cent-of-young-brits-want-a-socialist-economic-system-finds-new-poll/

[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0IepJqxRCZY

[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oukkfJNrV8g

[13] https://www.startribune.com/capitalism-with-scandinavian-characteristics/505916412/

[14] https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/27/nordic-countries-not-socialist-denmark-norway-sweden-centrist/

[15] https://www.finansnorge.no/statistikk/skadeforsikring/helseforsikring/behandlingsforsikring/

[16] https://www.ssb.no/en/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/nasjonalregnskap/statistikk/helseregnskap

[17] https://www.ssb.no/en/nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/nasjonalregnskap/statistikk/helseregnskap

[18] https://www.fhi.no/globalassets/dokumenterfiler/global-helse/evidence/health-care-financing-in-norway---lithuania---health-directorate-2020.pdf

[19] https://www.aleris.no/mer-om-oss/om/

[20] https://www.proff.no/selskap/aleris/oslo/leger/IFLRGGY00XB/

[21] All figures drawn from the OECD.Stat “Wealth” table for Norway, last updated in December 2021. https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?lang=en.

[22] https://wid.world/world/#shweal_p0p50_z/US;FR;DE;CN;ZA;GB;WO/last/eu/k/p/yearly/s/false/-9.318499999999998/20/curve/false/country

[23] https://www.dn.no/marked/investor-kjell-inge-rokke-melder-flytting-til-sveits-et-krevende-valg-er-tatt/2-1-1295652

[24]  The magazine publishes an annually updated list of the 400 wealthiest Norwegians, available online at: https://www.kapital.no/kapital-index/norges-400-rikeste. Correcting for inflation using Statistics Norway’s inflation calculator (https://www.ssb.no/kalkulatorer/priskalkulator) reveals the growth in real terms to be around 2.5 times, after adjusting nominal 2011 prices upward to average 2021 prices.

[25] https://e24.no/norsk-oekonomi/i/lVjMdk/ferske-tall-115000-norske-barn-vokser-opp-i-fattigdom

[26] https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/matsentralene-er-i-krise-og-mange-kan-ga-sultne-i-vinter-1.16103259

[27] https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/sysselsetting/statistikk/sysselsetting-blant-innvandrere-registerbasert/artikler/viken-er-mest-avhengig-av-utenlandsk-arbeidskraft

[28] https://www.ssb.no/arbeid-og-lonn/sysselsetting/statistikk/sysselsetting-blant-innvandrere-registerbasert/artikler/viken-er-mest-avhengig-av-utenlandsk-arbeidskraft

[29] https://www.nrk.no/norge/store-selger-seg-ut-av-boligprosjekt-etter-dagbladet-avsloring-1.13532421

[30] https://www.nrk.no/norge/store-tjente-tre-mill.-pa-omstridt-byggeprosjekt_-mottok-gratis-salgshjelp-fra-venn-1.13671955

[31] https://www.ssb.no/en/utenriksokonomi/utenrikshandel/statistikk/utenrikshandel-med-varer

[32] https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/08804/tableViewLayout1/

[33] https://www.thelocal.no/20161215/norways-statoil-exits-oil-sands-projects-in-canada/

[34] https://www.innovasjonnorge.no/globalassets/0-innovasjonnorge.no/subsites/in-south-america/publications/norwegian-investment-report-2021---english_screen_spread.pdf/

[35] https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/Market-Value/

[36] https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-1-20202021/id2768215/?ch=3#:~:text=%2B%20Overf%C3%B8rt%20fra%20Statens,371%2C2, Table 3.3.

[37] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/norway-wealth-fund-earns-177-bln-2021-2022-01-27/

[38] https://www.equinor.com/about-us/the-norwegian-state-as-shareholder

[39] https://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/economy/governments-revenues/

[40] https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/11290/tableViewLayout1/

[41] https://www.kapital.no/kapital-index/norges-400-rikeste

Notes on Evolutionary Game Design

The paradox of computer games is that the best of them offer a kind of limitless freedom to the player, but one which is, of course, tightly regulated by way of a predesigned architecture: all elements of subjective freedom have in fact been—in almost authoritarian, heavy-handed fashion—predetermined, hard-coded by a designer. It is a “very dependent, paradoxical kind of freedom” one enjoys in such games, as one commentator, Gabriel Winslow-Yost, has pointed out, where each “‘choice’ has to be coded in advance—each option something the designer wants you to do, to display this aspect of their creation” (August 18, 2022, NYRB, p. 44). 

Computer games are in this sense theological: they confront us with the paradox of freedom-with-constraint, with agency-contra-creation, the structuration of will within the framework of a prefabricated, ready-made reality. Just as human existence contains a kind of freedom-within-creation, so too do computer games - at least the best of them - exhibit a kind of freedom-within-code. One is free to act, but only within the limitations set by this code: the code itself remains strictly off-limits (unless one has the competence to engage in modding, which must usually be facilitated by the game’s designers). You can kill as many monsters as you like, but at the level of ordinary consumer experience, you cannot “kill” undesirable lines of code, or remake them. In games like The Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion and the series’ fifth installment, Skyrim, players are able to roam around vast tracts of virtual land, exploring both hard-coded and script-generated “dungeons,” pursuing adventures both generative and predesigned—though, of course, even that which is probabilistically generated must obey a predetermined set of variables and constraints laid down by the game studio’s designers. 

In the old days of computer gaming—the 1980s and 1990s—game “maps” were by and large hard-scripted. Every landscape was bespoke, every world fabricated to a specific, unchanging form. The boredom and limitation of this approach lies in the fact that each run-through of the game must necessarily follow more or less the same lines; one plays the same game—within certain bounds at least—as everyone else. With the possibility of generating “random” terrains—not truly random, of course, but generated within particular parameters fixed by the designer—elements of chance, unpredictability, and equally importantly, variability are introduced into the possibility-space of a game. 

The limitations of this wider, more flexible design approach, however, lie in the fact that too much of the designer’s hand still remains in play. What this option fails to accomplish is to transcend generativity-within-constraint, to attain a fundamentally more plastic generativity-of-constraint-itself: that is to say, the very architecture and “design” of the game—its rules, objectives, its fundamental form, and therefore its subjective “feel”—has not yet been subjected to quasi-randomization or generative principles. This, I claim, would make for a far more interesting video game experience, perhaps one that is yet to come.  We have maps that are made by the game’s creators, but we do not yet have a game that makes and remakes itself, perhaps in ways unimagined even by its creators.

Darwin discovered that organisms evolve into being from earlier organisms and forms by way of natural selection. But what Darwin could not have imagined is the more radically upsetting idea that even the principles underpinning life and reality itself may in some sense have evolved—have been selected for. We do not yet want to hold that this speculative notion bears the stamp of scientific truth. Perhaps some day the idea that the parameters of the Universe as such have been “worked through” to some more perfect stage of being. But as a speculative principle applied to other, lesser domains of social life, it surely contains some value. The future of gaming lies not only in evolving, or iterating, new locations, sets, and spaces within a predetermined framework, but in allowing the very framework itself to evolve, twisting and turning into hitherto unforeseen directions. A game that makes itself: now that would be a game worth playing.

Memories of Bob Hargrave (1949-2012), philosopher

From what I’ve been able to gather, Robert Mark Hargrave—his full name, so foreign to me—spent decades teaching philosophy at Oxford’s esteemed Balliol College, a cloistered environment of the British power elite that produced at once some of that country’s worst minds (Boris Johnson went there in the 1980s) and its finest (Adam Smith, Aldous Huxley; John Wycliffe was Master of Balliol way back in the 1360s; more recently, J. L. Austin, Harold Macmillan, Roy Bhaskar, Richard Dawkins...). 

Bob, as he was known affectionately to all his students, was above all a Socratic figure. He did not publish—he read, he thought carefully. His favorite activity, I think—his pride, his charm, as Deleuze would put it—was this thinking carefully. (He once made fun of me for waving my arms around, somewhat passionately, while making an argument; he thought this the pinnacle of ridiculousness, I think, that a person could get so carried away that they would let their emotions overrun their faculty of reason; he lamented my “hand-waving,” which he saw, I think, as a compensation for thinking carefully.) He loved solving crossword puzzles, seated out by the quad on a hard wood bench in a wool cardigan with a cup of coffee and pack of Gauloises—brain twisters, cognitive puzzles, mathematical quandaries, or some hapless undergraduate’s essay, to be marked in red pen with such peculiar annotations as the abbreviation “W. A.!”—short for the German phrase Wachet auf! (“Wake up!”). He lamented this absence of wakefulness in the young, this inability to see the full implications of one’s positions. Inconsistency and self-contradiction were the prime targets of this terrifyingly incisive mind. And always this interminable coffee, this endless smoking of cigarettes (which would unfortunately be his demise, his cancer proving terminal)…

I recall our tutorials on John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism on Saturday mornings in the “Buttery,” the college bar; exactly at noon he rubbed his hands together vigorously and proclaimed with evident relish, “Time for my noon glass of wine!”, before embarking on yet another inquisition of our—a group of three or four first-year undergraduates’—reading of Mill the previous weeks along with the secondary literature: Roger Crisp’s little book and J. J. C Smart and Bernard Williams’ Utilitarianism: For and Against. I think perhaps he looked down on our little group for trading the Logic paper for mere moral philosophy, Logic being his favorite thing in the whole wide world—one of my first memories as a first-year student was Bob speaking with great gusto in a glass-lined,  modern meeting room (so out of place in the college’s medieval environs) about the importance of AND, the operator, and that a good deal of the world’s problems might be solved if we could only see that we needed to think not in terms of BUT—of opposition and contrast—but (!) AND, which is to say unity and synthesis. And it is a productive mental device, replacing all one’s “but”s with “and”s; it does effect a cognitive shift; one begins to see the possibility of unity where once there seemed hard, unyielding opposition.

Bob was also a great prankster, by his own admission. He delighted in telling us enraptured undergrads how he shared initials with the considerably older, far more widely-known (and more published) analytic philosopher R. M. Hare, whom I think Bob found a bit insufferable: in the college pub back in the 80s, Bob apparently made a habit of signing off his not-inconsiderable drinks bill with the initials R. M. H., trading on the ambiguity of the overlapping initials, with the consequence that poor Professor Richard Mervyn Hare was saddled with the wine bills of one Mr. R. M. Hargrave…

For he was precisely a “Mr.”—the only faculty member tarnished with this shameful civilian title in a sea of “Dr.”s. The title of “Mr.” stuck out like a sore thumb on the white-painted black tablets listing the names of faculty. He lacked credentials, but in the best possible sense. He had earned no doctoral degree, so far as I have been able to establish, and had no real publications to his name. In the Bodleian Library’s digital catalogue, I can only find one entry under “Hargrave, R. M. (Robert Mark), author”: a B.Phil. thesis with the enigmatic title Samesaying, almost Derridean in its tenor, published in 1978, Faculty of Literae Humaniores; University College, Oxford. It contains 81 leaves, measures 31 cm. Status: Theses Closed Stack (Stored Offsite). One of his students James M. Arnold has taken the trouble of scanning it and uploading it to his website: “Be aware that there is no p. 37, as it is missing from the manuscript held by the Bodleian Library.” Another Bob-like mystery, this case of the missing thirty-seventh page…In the acknowledgments, Bob thanks Peter Strawson and Simon Blackburn, and Blackburn in particular, “who with infinite patience managed to fulfil the role of sounding board without sounding bored”—a classic Bob-ism, typical of his dry, wry wit. The thesis itself I am not qualified to assess: It is heavily invested in the logical formalism of Oxford-style language philosophy, for which I confess I still have far too little patience—I am still too much of a hand-waver. Its opening salvo, “§1. What should we demand of a formal theory of meaning for a natural language L?”, was ambitious for a bachelor’s thesis, no doubt, and I should one day like to read it in full. But Bob was not a writer, a publisher of tracts, and so I readily confess I am not a reader-of-Bob, but rather an admirer-of-Bob, a thinker-with-Bob, who remembers above all else this at once lovable, prickly, thoughtful, cantankerous, jovial figure, a latter-day Socratic, in an era where such figures are no longer allowed to exist in a global academic system increasingly inimical to thought itself, thought at all costs, thought in place of the frenetic pseudo-activity of the funding bodies, with their futile “research assessment exercises,” or indeed of the professions and disciplines themselves…Was Bob not also a product of that informal motto of the college, “Effortless superiority,” a positive superciliousness that does not require a thinker to leave a written trace, so many signs, which are even faintly disreputable? To be a scholar is to have skholé, leisure, as Bourdieu reminds us. There is something gentlemanly, or gentlewomanly, about pure thought—aloof from the world of mere commerce, the traffic of printed words…This is both its risk and great attraction.

Bob was a huge admirer of the obscure Australian linguist Victor (Vic) Dudman. On Bob’s website, still archived by one of his many loving students, he declares Dudman a kind of keeper of secrets, one who has peered deep into the mysteries of language…Bob’s lesson, however, was finally not some particular language-philosophical argument about the inadequacy of the grammarians and the importance of semanticism, or similar. Rather, Bob’s lesson was at once more oblique, more general: The point of life is—to think: the pleasure of thinking, the iconoclasm of it, the hard clarity and piercing light of thought, which burns everything in its path, and which thereby clears a space for real action, properly conceived works…I can still see Bob now before my mind’s eye, nearly a decade after his passing: this philosophical rogue, grey-bearded, scraggly white hair, darkly intense eyes peering out from his bushy, raven-like eyebrows, wearing his signature wool cardigan, arms resting on his knees, and an impish smile on his lips: Stop waving your arms around! Not BUT— but (!) AND!

Some Scattered Remarks on John Barton's (2020) 'A History of the Bible'

[Review: John Barton (2020). A History of the Bible. London: Penguin.]

With friends like John Barton, who needs the New Atheists? 

The most effective opponents of Christian spirituality today are not its overt detractors but its academic analysts, who don’t so much deny God as paint all things theological in so much grey in grey, as Hegel might have said. It is above all a sad book, freighted down by the sadness of spiritlessness, effectively diminishing the spiritual core that makes the Christian take on the Bible so attractive in the first place. We care for the Bible not because it is a complex patchwork of sources and genres, but because it vibrates with divine energy. Buried beneath a morass of textual criticism, whither belief in the risen Christ? Where is the sense of Immanuel, “God with us,” that has drawn and continues to draw millions into a christocentric existence? 

In the chapter on the Psalms, to take but one example, we find nothing about the spiritually uplifting, salutary effects of their reading, their potential role in an individual believer’s prayer life, only an attempt to situate, contextualize, historicize; but nothing at all about how one might read them prayerfully, and so come to commune with the Lord. The fact that such sentiments now seem faintly ridiculous from the vantagepoint of the academy is a testament to the damage that much academic theology has done to the very notion of a spiritual life, which is of course not this book’s doing alone. But it is a Lord-less reading of the Bible so characteristic of aspiritual, if not outright antispiritual, academic theology. There is something unattractively antiseptic about theological aspirituality. It is the objectivizing, analytical approach to the Bible that misses the very ineffable Thing that makes it so potentially inviting and agreeable in the first place.

Barton’s great finding is that the Bible does not “map” cleanly onto Judaism and Christianity as they have come to be practiced. But this is hardly news. It ought to ruffle no feathers. The Catholic Church expressly teaches the twin validity and efficacy of Scripture and Tradition, the latter indicating the two-millennia-long institutional unfolding of practice in historico-social time. Perhaps this is news to Protestantism, which is so often a kind of Christianity minus historical consciousness. Expecting a liturgical or ecclesial paradigm to jump straight off the pages of Scripture, unmediated by historical development and the social accretions resulting in a particular mode of institutional life, is surely vain. Notice that for those who hold that the Spirit guides human action and intervenes in social time, this ineluctably socio-historical dimension of the faith-life is utterly unconcerning—as unconcerning as Darwin’s principle of natural selection, which is so obviously compatible with the notion of Spirit’s march through history—the evolutionary principle being merely the concrete expression of the divine will at a glacial pace—that one cannot but be genuinely puzzled by the fact that so much has been made of the supposed opposition between science and faith. Barton’s core thesis is, in short, underwhelming.

In places he is strangely irreverent, as when he writes that “the dating of the New Testament books has been described as like a line of drunks, propping each other up, with no fixed wall to lean on” (p. 162). It’s a simile, harmless enough, but one that still betrays a certain failure to stand in awe of the text. If one were to say that Oxford professors of theology are like a line of drunks propping each other up, each confirming the other’s authority by mutual support, one could rightly be accused of a certain juvenile malevolence. Some of this same silliness is at work when Barton speculates freely about whether Matthew and Luke might not have “made any of it up themselves” (p. 196). 

The notion, moreover, that it is a mark of the “conservative” to emphasize the Bible’s divine inspiration, while liberals are happy to date the books of the New Testament to a later date (p. 163), presumably because they do not believe in anything quite so unempirical as divine inspiration, is surely flawed. To use one of Barton’s favorite terms, the divine/human binary doesn’t “map” onto the conservative/liberal divide. It is perfectly possibly to espouse a left-wing, radical Christianity and still afirm the essential role of the Spirit’s guidance in the formation of ta biblia.

At one point, Barton avows, “Despite centuries of research [the Synoptic Gospels] remain an enigma, and those who revere them should be aware of how much we do not know about their composition” (p. 199). But couldn’t this admonition just as well be turned on its head? That those who would “scientifically” criticize these writings are ultimately confounded by the scantiness of evidence upon which to adjudicate between their various hypotheses and so left in a state of indecision or forced to decide the truth by mere fiat? What is striking about the Gospels is how clearly they throw us back on our own faith; they refuse to do anything quite so vulgar as yield to the seizing, grasping quality of much philological theology. There are an outsize number of “presumablies” and “possiblies” in this field.

Far more significant is Barton’s key take on the Gospels, which is that they “circulated by word of mouth for a generation before the Gosepl writers began their work” (p. 174). While this is of course quite a popular position, it makes too much of the folkishness of the gospels. The idea of a “generation” interceding between the crucifixion and the first gospel’s production muddles the distinction between a “generation” as a temporal marker (roughly 30 years) and generation understood as a distinctive subgroup in the population; while 30 years may indeed have passed between the crucifixion and Mark’s gospel, this does not mean that there was a wholly different subset of individuals around the gospel writer from Jesus’ own lifetime. It is conceivable that many of the original eyewitnesses to the life, ministry, death, and resurrection were available as primary sources to the gospel writers—certainly to Mark. Barton’s claim that Mark was “at some distance from the events he narrated” (p. 189) is therefore quite unmoving. If I were to write a book about the collapse of the Berlin Wall, I could still find hundreds if not thousands of people who were actually there at the tearing down of the wall. The story of the Berlin Wall’s collapse has indeed circulated verbally for decades, but that doesn’t meant that this oral, folkloric dimension is our only or even primary evidentiary base should we wish to delve further into the matter; we can also talk to the people who were really there. Mark’s remove at some decades from the events is unworrying in the measure that one believes in the basic possibility of post-factum journalistic reportage. 

But Barton remains unswayed by the idea that the Gospels might be eyewitness accounts (p. 189). He levels against them the disqualifying charge that “only two of them are even ascribed to members of the twelve apostles.” This is surely a weak argument against their possible eyewitness status—not first-hand but second-hand eyewitness reporting, filtered through a reporter, of course; neither Mark nor Luke claim to have seen Jesus with their own eyes, so this cannot be what is meant by “eyewitness” in these instances. A very obvious method for bolstering their credibility would have been to ascribe all Gospels to one or other of Jesus’ disciples. The very fact that Mark and Luke weren’t disciples is, if anything, a greater reason for the credibility of their accounts. We might have had greater cause for suspicion if they were instead the Gospels of, say, Bartholomew or Simon the Zealot. (And indeed the later Gnostic imposition of the Gospel of Thomas makes use precisely of this strategy.) One could object that a very clever forger would know that this would be a little too neatly packaged, and therefore cause for suspicion, and so decided to “throw in” a couple of odd ducks, but this verges on the conspiratorial.

In places there is a certain naïvete about mobility in the Mediterranean world. Barton seems impressed by the fact that a papyrus of John’s Gospel “that turned up in Egypt can be dated to the early second century, not long after the Gospel’s composition, probably in Asia Minor, which ‘attests to the remarkably rapid and wide circulation of the text,’” as he writes, citing Richard Bauckham (p. 202). But this is only surprising if we are ignorant of the fact that Mediterranean peoples could travel very quickly by ship. The Mediterranean was, at least to a select segment of the population, a strangely mobile place. Pliny the Elder recounts that a voyage from Messina (outside Rome) to Alexandria in Egypt only took six days, with favorable winds. Messina is considerably farther away from Alexandria than Asia Minor. They didn’t go the long way around. And scrolls didn’t take up much room on ample-sized shipping vessels. Indeed, much about the history of the New Testament begins to make more sense once we realize that people and goods could move around the region quite quickly. Diodorus Siculus records a typical voyage with favorable winds from Rhodes to Alexandria taking no more than three-and-a-half days. The notion of an isolated Johannine, Lukan, Marcan etc. community (p. 201) falters once we recognize the reality of Mediterranean mobility. Ours is not the only “liquid society,” to use Zygmunt Bauman’s term. In all the Gospels, what is the one thing Jesus seems to do a lot of in all of them? He moves around constantly. What is the one thing Paul seems to do a lot of in Acts? He moves around constantly. The New Testament is the story of the Word on the go.

Barton meanwhile thinks the Gospels could not possibly have been written in Palestine because they are in Greek, and the first communities of Jesus-followers there “would more likely have written in Aramaic” (p. 200). Scholars have questioned this assumption under the rubric of what is called “the Greek hypothesis,” the idea that “Greek was the lingua franca and an everyday language of the people in ancient Palestine,  particularly, in Roman Galilee” (Ong 2017: 218). Greek was what tied the Roman Empire together, as Barton himself admits at one point, and much of the Mediterranean besides; why must we assume that it hadn’t made significant headway in Palestine as well? This would also give short shrift to the assumption that Matthew (a tax collector, and so a member of the professional class) and Luke (believed to have been a doctor) couldn’t possibly have written their Gospels themselves in the Greek. All of this matters because Barton clings to the notion that these are collective enterprises (p. 200: “the various Gentile churches...as the source for the Gospels”), rather than what they set out to be, namely the work of one author—though, naturally, relying upon multiple sources, as Luke himself makes clear in his introduction.

Barton’s claim that the New Testament lacks textual support for the idea of the Trinity is similarly weak. “References to God as Trinity are largely missing from the New Testament,” he claims (p. 327). But this trope is growing stale. In so doing, he discounts entirely Matthew 3:16-17, where the Spirit of God (the third entity of the Trinity) descends on Jesus “like a dove,” and “a voice from heaven”—distinctive now from the Spirit/dove—declares him to be the “beloved Son.” Here we have all three persons of the Trinity in one compressed moment. The episode is also recounted in Luke 3:21-22 and Mark 1:10-11. What is crucial to notice is the presence of Spirit, Son, and a distinctive third actor, a “voice [that] came from heaven” (Mark 1:11; Luke 3:22). Barton seems to measure the trinitarianism of the New Testament by whether it makes “explicit reference to God as Trinity” (p. 327), but so much of the pleasure of the New Testament resides in the interpretive demands it makes on its readers. We cannot expect these things to be laid out cleanly, like a Wikipedia page in Simple English.

The limits of a nonspiritual academic approach are only emphasized in the claim that the evangelists jealously guarded their work as the sole fount of evangelic truth. “When we continue to read Mark, we are in a way contradicting what both Matthew and Luke intended: they wanted us to read only their version of the Gospel, and to leave Mark behind” (p. 201). This claim is downright bizarre; we have absolutely no evidence that this is how Matthew or Luke thought about Mark. If I were to write a book about the Second World War, I wouldn’t particularly mind that there were a number of other books purporting to tell the same story; in fact I’d welcome this multiplicity of voices for what fresh light it might throw upon the events. With the generosity of spirit evident in all the evangelists, we certainly have more reason to expect this attitude than the sort of covetous protectiveness that Barton implies of them on this point. More spiritually, we might say that that their intentions matter little given that the workings of the Spirit has ensured the survival of all four gospels: they are meant to be read in tandem, in conjunction; one of the core socio-theoretical message of the Gospels is precisely this multiplicity and polyphony, which gives rise to what we might call the imperative of interpretation: We are duty-bound to employ our reason, our logos, to grasp He who was the Logos in the beginning.

Of course, polite academic theology can’t bring itself to say such things, because it can’t say that the Spirit does anything, only that some people say or believe the Spirit does so. There is, on the whole, a productive distinction to be made between a dead-letter theology and a living-spirit theology. The latter is meditative, spiritual, contemplative, the kind of writing that readily invites a lectio divina. This latter form of theology is much to be preferred to the former, but is so seldom in evidence today. It is, on the whole, peculiar that theology, the logos of the theos who is the fount of life, should so often feel so lifeless. Lifelessness is clearly not a straightforwardly objective literary condition; it is a condition that must be argued. But I claim that even a brief survey of much that is written on theological matters in the academy today is narrow, thin, dry, spiritless—lifeless. How came this to pass? Probably some feature of university discourse, some procedure of faculty training, recruitment, and reproduction, some insidious divide between faith and reason, which has wiggled its way even into the halls of scholarship on the divine.

Much is also made by Barton of a supposed inconsistency in Paul’s life as it is portrayed in his own letters contra Acts, conventionally assumed to have been written by Luke. Barton writes, “From 2 Corinthians 11:23-9 we learn that Paul had often been in prison, as well as punished by flogging, shipwrecked, and subject to all kinds of other hardships and calamities, something we would not guess from Acts, where only one single night in prison is reported (Acts 16:19-40) before Paul’s final arrest in Jerusalem” (p. 176; emphasis added). One is tempted to ask: How long does Barton want Paul to be in jail? The Jerusalem-Rome detention must have lasted long enough. But Acts is filled to the brim with Pauline suffering. The only way we can make sense of this statement is if we permit Barton to slip from the wider point about Paul’s suffering, indicated by Barton’s statement pertaining to “all kinds of other hardships and calamities,” to a narrower focus on Paul’s incarceration.

But Acts is full of stories where Paul could very plausibly have been detained at length. Remember that imprisonment in the ancient world was mainly a means to further (corporal) punishment and not, broadly speaking, a form of punishment in its own right; there were many more occasions for being jailed than to (anachronistically) serve a sentence, which is chiefly a modern invention. Thus, when Paul and Barnabas are “sent for” by the proconsul of Paphos in Acts 13:7, they might very well have been detained in some way, possibly at length, though to modern readers it might read like a polite dinner invitation. Similarly, when the crowd “began to contradict” and “heaped abuse” on Paul in Pisidian Antioch (Acts 13:44), this may have involved some form of physical detainment: “They stirred up persecution against Paul and Barnabas, and expelled them from their region” (Acts 13:50). Again, we moderns might tend to imagine this scene as one of Paul and Barnabas somehow running for their lives, with the crowd at their heels, or fleeing in the night, but might it not have been more akin to the arrest of a foreign dissident followed by their expulsion by an authoritarian regime, usually involving some form of close confinement?

The examples could be multiplied, but the point is that there are definite passages in Acts that suggest the plausible possibility of Paul’s confinement beyond that of Acts 21:27-30. The conflict between Acts and Paul’s epistles is largely a figment of the modern mind. But beyond this, why should we assume that Acts is an exhaustive biography of Paul’s life? It probably isn’t, and clearly involves temporal compression and cutaways to focus not on Paul’s biographical details but on the pentecostal story. Acts is about the concrete movements of the Spirit across time and space in the post-Ascension age; to the extent that Paul’s biographical details are of relevance to this wider story, they are included, albeit in piecemeal fashion. One has the feeling that Barton, for all his learning, has not really penetrated to the core of this text, and this is just one example of a strange lack of analytic acuity, perhaps stemming from a desire to score points against a pious fundamentalism perceived to be at odds with enlightened critical historicism.

A good spiritual book—which might very well be the aspiration of any work of theology—should feel at least a bit like a warm bath for the soul. A History of the Bible is more like a tub of astringent. Its chambers are an antiseptic operating room, leaving this reader on the whole decidedly cold. Hemmed in by a narrow method called “critical,” we lose sight of the spiritual dimension at the core of Christianity. Now one might say this is making a simple category mistake or error of genre; that this is a work of history. But it is not the history-telling that rubs this reader wrong, but precisely all the strictly theological asides, the sweeping claims, the dismissive attitude toward millennia-long piety.

“Faith is the ability to go beyond our own human, intramundane and personal ‘truth’ and apprehend the absolute truth of the God,” wrote Hans Urs von Balthasar (1986: 33-34), “who unveils and offers himself to us, acknowledging it to be the greater truth, allowing it to be the decisive factor in our lives. The person who has faith and describes himself as a believer is actually saying that he has the ability to hear God’s word.” Perhaps this is what is missing from this book: a sense that faith, not just studiousness, is needed to penetrate the book said to contain this word. Without faith, the Bible will remain “so much straw,” to quote Aquinas. And without an imbrication of analysis with faith, this analysis will remain straw-like.

Actually, pure philology, if such a thing were possible, can be highly enjoyable, with all of its deliciously technical rigor and carefully circumscribed statements of fact—or as near to fact as is possible. What is troubling about this book is not its philologicity, as it were, but its asides, its over-reach, its snark, its desire to construct an ideological figment known as conservatism, which feel like unnecessary admissions to secularity. Certainly there are conservative Christians, but are they identical to what Barton seems to think of as scriptural conservatives? I wonder whether this book, like so many works of history, shouldn’t have thought more carefully and explicitly about its theoretical categories, of which “liberal” and “conservative” seem to do be doing a lot of the heavy lifting, though mostly in the background. Most historians prefer to bury their theory in detail. Bring it to light instead.

This isn’t to say that there isn’t much to be learned from this book in terms of technical details, events, concepts, key figures, and so on. There are the occasional factual mistakes, unavoidable in a work of this length: Augustine speaks of Ambrose’s recommendation that he read Isaiah in Book 9, chapter 5 of his Confessions, not Book 5, chapter 9, as Barton claims (p. 90, footnote 5). More to the point: What is missing from this work of theological history is a spiritual core, a standing-in-awe before the object of study. Without this spiritual dimension, without this standing-in-awe before the cathedral of the Book, the Bible will necessarily remain closed to even the most studious of scholars and readers. It will remain one book among many—impressive, certainly, but not essentially suffused with Spirit.

References

von Balthasar, H. U. (1987) Prayer. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

Ong, H. T. (2017) The use of Greek in first-century Palestine: An issue of method in dialogue with Scott D. Charlesworth. In: The Language and Literature of the New Testament: Essays in Honor of Stanley E. Porter’s 60th Birthday. Leiden: Brill, pp. 218-236.